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ABSTRACT 
Background 
Dementia has been described as the greatest global health challenge in the 21st century on account of 
longevity gains increasing its incidence, escalating health and social care pressures. These pressures 
highlight ethical, social, political challenges about healthcare resource allocation, what health 
improvements matter to patients, and how they are measured. This study highlights the complexity of 
the ethical landscape, relating particularly to the balances that need to be struck when allocating 
resources; when measuring and prioritising outcomes; and when individual preferences are sought.  
Objective 
Health outcome prioritisation is the ranking in order of desirability or importance of a set of disease-
related objectives and their associated cost or risk. We analyse the complex ethical landscape in which 
this takes place in the most common dementia, Alzheimer’s disease. 
Methods  
Narrative review of literature published since 2007, incorporating snowball sampling where 
necessary. We identified, thematised and discussed key issues of ethical salience.  
Results 
Eight areas of ethical salience for outcome prioritisation emerged: (1) Public health and distributive 
justice, (2) Scarcity of resources, (3) Heterogeneity and changing circumstances, (4) Knowledge of 
treatment, (5) Values and circumstances, (6) Conflicting priorities, (7) Communication, autonomy and  
Caregiver issues, (8) Disclosure of risk. 
Conclusion 
These areas highlight the difficult balance to be struck when allocating resources, when measuring 
and prioritising outcomes, and when individual preferences are sought. We conclude by reflecting on 
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how tools in social sciences and ethics can help address challenges posed by resource allocation, 
measuring and prioritising outcomes, and eliciting stakeholder preferences. 
Keywords: Alzheimer Disease, Dementia, Health Priorities, Ethics 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Health outcome prioritisation is the ranking in order of desirability or importance of a set of disease-
related objectives and their associated cost or risk, obtained collaboratively with or from patients and 
their carers. It can occur at several levels and by different stakeholders, including: between a doctor 
[1], nurse [2], pharmacist [3] or other healthcare professional and an individual patient; within 
families of an individual or individuals with AD  [4,5] between cohorts of patients and researchers in 
a Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) [6]; by national healthcare systems such as the National Health 
Service (NHS) and associated resource allocation bodies such as the National Institute for Clinical 
and Care Excellence (NICE) [7]; and at the international level between governments when 
collaborating on meeting global health priorities [8]. Situations in which outcome prioritisation is 
useful include: i) regulatory scenarios for assessing benefit to risk ratio by, for example, establishing 
which endpoints would be the most relevant to measure in an RCT; ii) economic scenarios 
considering 'value for money', as the finitude of resources precludes being able to fund every 
intervention; iii) questions of individual benefit-to-risk ratios to establish what kind of care a 
particular patient wishes to receive.  
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common type of dementia and a ‘global public health priority’. 
[9,10] Some evidence suggests the prevalence of all-cause dementia rates may be declining [11], 
however with an ageing population and older people are living longer the incidence of specific 
dementias such as AD may continue to rise [12].  The prospect of a global prevalence of 131.5 million 
[11] imposes a significant and growing costs, necessitating innovation in the management of dementia 
[13]. 
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In this paper we describe and analyse the evidence base for the complex ethical landscape of health 
outcome prioritisation as it takes place in the most common form of dementia, AD. The paper was 
produced as an Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) output for the European Union and 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI)-funded consortium project, ROADMAP: Real World Outcomes 
across the AD spectrum for better care [14]. The authorial team is comprised of researchers working 
on the ROADMAP project, including clinicians, scientists, and patient representatives with expertise 
in AD, led by three bioethicists with expertise in analysing ethical issues in healthcare and medicine. 
Although there are several types of dementia, ROADMAP focuses exclusively on AD dementia; as 
such, the paper analyses ethical issues in health outcome prioritisation for AD alone. The research 
questions we seek to answer are: 
• What are the ethical issues that drive outcome prioritisation? 
• What balances need to be struck when prioritising outcomes? 
Our analysis highlights eight key areas of ethical salience to fair outcome prioritisation in AD. There 
is currently no curative treatment for AD; as such, while we assume that if it were possible to cure 
AD, most individuals would be likely to prioritise this over other outcomes, since no cure exists, the 
review focuses on how outcomes other than this might be weighed and prioritised. The themes that 
emerged from our analysis illustrate the challenges of realising outcomes and making prioritisation 
choices. Given the growing global prevalence of AD analysis of these ethical issues is timely and 
necessary. 
 
METHODS 
A narrative review based on a mixture of structured and ad-hoc searching of academic literature was 
conducted. This is a narrative, rather than systematic, review, capturing the landscape of the debate 
rather than surveying the prevalence of different views in the literature. While establishing the relative 
prevalence of different themes or theories would be independently interesting, our aim was the 
identification of these in the literature rather than their relative prominence. This choice reflects our 
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presumption that the normative legitimacy of ethical challenges is not a function of the frequency of 
their discussion. 
Relevant manuscripts were identified in several stages. First, a structured search was carried out in 
January 2018 and updated in September 2019 across five academic indexes: EMBASE, PubMed (incl. 
MEDLINE), Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar. The search identified articles with 
relevant titles using the search strings listed in Table 1.  
Database Search Strings # Returned 
EMBASE [ethic* AND outcome*] AND [priorit* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
 
7 
[ethic* AND priorit*] AND [outcome* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
19 
PubMed [incl. 
MEDLINE] 
[ethic* AND outcome*] AND [priorit* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
7 
[ethic* AND priorit*] AND [outcome* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
21 
Scopus 
 
 
[ethic* AND outcome*] AND [priorit* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
10 
[ethic* AND priorit*] AND [outcome* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
23 
Web of Science 
 
 
[ethic* AND outcome*] AND [priorit* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
4 
[ethic* AND priorit*] AND [outcome* OR health* OR 
alzheimer* OR dementia*] 
17 
Google Scholar 
[strings 
allintitle: [ethics OR ethical] AND [outcome OR 
outcomes] AND [prioritization OR prioritisation OR 
11 
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modified for 
compliance with 
search engine 
formatting] 
 
 
priority OR health OR healthcare OR health-related OR 
health-care OR alzheimer's OR alzheimer OR dementia] 
allintitle: [ethics OR ethical] AND [prioritization OR 
prioritisation OR priority OR priorities] AND [outcome 
OR outcomes OR health OR healthcare OR health-related 
OR health-care OR alzheimer's OR alzheimer OR 
dementia] 
18 
TOTAL (Unique papers) 49 
Table 1 – Structured search results 
The keyword search was limited to the ‘Article Title’, for three reasons. First, a search of titles was 
likely to yield those articles most directly pertinent to our analysis. Second, additional snowball 
sampling via further references supplied by co-authors, and via screening of the references of already 
included studies  identified further relevant research representing a broad range of stakeholders in 
AD,. Third, a preliminary search of abstracts as well as titles yielded an extremely large sample that, 
on the basis of screening a sample of the papers returned, added noise but little value in relation to 
capturing the principles of the ethical debate, when compared to the results of a title only search. This 
is to say that numerous papers are available which happen to use some of our keywords, but on 
reviewing are not pieces of research which are about ethics in any way that is relevant to our purpose. 
For example, a title and abstract search on SCOPUS for articles published in English for the specified 
date range using key terms ethic* priorit* and health* returned 6820 documents. 
To ensure a manageable and contemporary sample, we restricted our search to literature in peer-
reviewed journal articles and conference proceedings published from 2007, ten years before work on 
the study began. Additionally, we only reviewed articles written in English. Article abstracts and, if 
needed, full texts were then assessed for relevance by a single reviewer. A subset of 20 articles was 
screened by a second reviewer, and the results of this screening by the two reviewers were compared 
for consistency in assessing the relevance of the study to the purposes of the review. This comparison 
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yielded an agreement of 85%, which indicated a reliable degree of consistency, and discussion of the 
reasons for the discrepancies in the remaining helped to refine shared understanding of the criteria 
when further screening was carried out. Finally, we screened the references of included articles to 
identify further relevant articles and allowed all authors to suggest further relevant articles not 
identified by the initial search (“snowball sampling”).  
49 articles were retrieved by the initial search. 36 of these were rejected, either due to being judged 
insufficiently relevant after review; because they were irretrievable; or having been published in a 
language other than English, leaving 13 included and reviewed here. Snowball sampling and the 
introduction of additional previously collected articles of contextual relevance yielded a further 119 
references, giving a total of 125 documents pertaining to ethical issues in outcome prioritisation in 
AD reviewed and discussed. Three references pertaining to research methodology were also provided 
for support in study design and data analysis. 
Analysis of the papers aimed to map the landscape of prevalent ethical themes in the academic and 
clinical discussion around outcome prioritisation in healthcare generally and Alzheimer’s disease 
specifically. To identify themes for discussion, a pre-defined thematic framework was not used; 
rather, themes emerging from the literature were identified [15]. Each paper was read in full, key 
passages were highlighted that addressed ethical issues or concepts, understood here as areas of ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ or competing values and normative interests. Highlighted segments were labelled with 
codes reflecting the lead author’s interpretation of the text [16]. Our analytic approach was informed 
by established 'realist' and 'meta-narrative' methods of qualitative synthesis, drawing on previous 
ethics-focused review studies for guidance [17–19]. Discussion of the themes occurred between co-
authors, who come from disciplines including philosophy, epidemiology, psychology and psychiatry, 
public health, as well as the pharmaceutical industry. Themes were reviewed and discussed at each 
draft iteration of the study until consensus was reached and there was agreement among all of the 
authors that the themes accurately reflected the findings of the analysis. This required five such  
iterations in total, at which point the thematic categorisation was finalised. 
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RESULTS 
Below, we outline eight areas of ethical salience in outcome prioritisation that emerged from the 
analysis. These eight areas are not themselves ranked in order of priority or importance; rather they 
reflect the landscape of matters of key ethical importance that arose from the review: (1) Public health 
and distributive justice, (2) Scarcity of resources, (3) Heterogeneity and changing circumstances, (4) 
Evidence, (5) Values and circumstances, (6) Conflicting priorities, (7) Communication, autonomy and 
caregiver issues, (8) Disclosure of risk.  
Public Health and Distributive Justice 
A key ethical aspect of contemporary AD management is the shift towards public health prevention 
[10] away from clinical medicine [20], to contain the costs of supporting an expanding and ageing 
population in which AD prevalence will increase [21–23]. However the benefits of a preventive 
approach should not be overstated [20,24], rather, the benefits of promoting general health advice may 
extend to dementia [10]. This shift is important for determining an ethical prioritisation of outcomes 
in two respects. 
First, public information about how to reduce the risk of dementia through lifestyle modifications 
from early life onwards affects the relationship between the state and its citizens [25]. Pressure to 
make certain choices may be viewed as an infringement of liberty [26,27], particularly where the state 
establishes policies that expect individuals to modify their behaviour; or prioritise treatment based on 
following preventative recommendations. Moreover, recommending lifestyle modifications that 
provide no guarantee to prevent AD may be viewed as unacceptably paternalistic and corrode trust. 
Second, the application of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) to individual priorities may not 
adequately capture the subjectively bound nature of 'quality of life' or ‘well-being’, despite the 
centrality of both to ensuring a successful outcome for people with AD, given that personal 
evaluations of concepts such as these  differ [28,29]. Furthermore, ‘benefit’ and ‘value’ may be 
interpreted differently. From a health economic perspective it is essential to attach a particular price to 
a particular level of benefit [30], however the priorities of individuals with AD are likely to differ 
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from other stakeholders, such as patients, their carers, health care professionals, providers, and payers 
of medical treatments [31].  
Scarcity of Resources 
Outcome prioritisation requires distributing limited resources to achieve desired outcomes. How these 
distribution decisions are made differs geographically. For example, in the UK, NICE prioritises cost-
effectiveness, whereas cost-effectiveness does not inform decision-making in Germany, and in the 
Netherlands it informs decision-making but only above a certain price threshold (very cheap drugs do 
not attract scrutiny) [32]. 
Irrespective of particular metrics used, the finitude of resources means that some people will be 
denied access to interventions that would benefit them [33–35]. This is ethically significant since the 
needs of some will be de-prioritised in favour of the needs of others, and the resulting gap may 
conflict with the clinical duty of care (this also holds for prioritisation between people with the same 
condition and people with different conditions). As [36] summarises baldly, to prioritise is inevitably 
to say ‘no’ to somebody. 
This is especially acute in the AD context, in which many people are unable to derive significant 
value, given that no curative treatments are yet available and evidence for the effectiveness of 
preventative interventions is weak. In light of this some have concluded that the greatest need is for 
high-quality long term care, and similarly high-quality support for family carers, such that the lives of 
people with AD and their families are made as satisfying as possible in the absence of any treatment 
that would decisively reverse the disease [5,37]. Indeed, research carried out by Kelly et al [2015, p. 
990] [38] with people with dementia, their carers, clinicians, and other health professional finds 
preferences of this kind in the top ten overall prioritised outcomes across all groups. 
Encouragingly, for the findings of our own analysis, there is also significant parity with the Kelly et al 
[Ibid.] study insofar as ethical dilemmas over finite resources report shared concerns, for example: 
negotiating the balance of benefits between pharmacological and lifestyle or social interventions; 
evaluating the value of early diagnosis in light of its psychological impact in the absence of a cure; 
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how to optimise outcomes for people with advanced dementia at the end of life;  and how to also 
support carers of people with AD as well as people with AD themselves. 
Heterogeneity and Changing Circumstances 
Prioritisation decisions are ultimately concerned with both outcomes and endpoints, which are related 
but distinct parameters. Outcomes denote measured effects of treatment, whereas endpoints are pre-
identified targets of a study built into its design [39]. From an international perspective, the outcomes 
and endpoints considered important may differ, depending on characteristics of particular markets 
[39]. Moreover, the definition, diagnostic cut-off and mechanism of measuring the numerous potential 
outcomes and endpoints continue to be debated; and the difficulty of determining preferences for 
these – for example living longer, declining more slowly, or dying sooner before more serious 
incapacity - is compounded by the plethora of available assessment tools. A further challenge in AD – 
and in the context of other conditions - is that assessment tools measuring a wide range of domains 
including memory, spatial orientation, semantic processing, speech, emotion, mood, apathy, 
aggression, mobility [40–42] are not ideally sensitive or specific and so do not yield perfect validity 
either in earlier and preclinical stages of the disease [40] or in more severe stages [41,42].  
In addition to this heterogeneity in assessment tools, changing background circumstances also affect 
prioritisation decisions. Prioritisation is also made complex by the heterogeneity of AD itself, in that 
the disease affects different individuals in different ways, in different cultural contexts, and at 
different stages of the disease; indeed, priorities are likely to differ in line with the progression of the 
disease, since the impact of MCI, for example, is less severe than very advanced AD later in life 
[12,41]. As such the AD community itself cannot be assumed to be homogeneous with respect to how 
members of it are affected by the disease [42,43], which underlines the risk of assuming that the 
priorities of one AD population subgroup is necessarily representative of other subgroups or the AD 
population at large. Moreover, not only are resources for people with AD limited (as above), but their 
availability is not necessarily constant. For example, external or short-term political factors and 
election cycles can affect both health policy and budgets, which shape prioritisation decisions [44]. 
Equally, prioritisation is shaped by new advances in medical science that expand what is 
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therapeutically possible. Furthermore, global trends towards population growth and increasing life 
expectancy may mean a future in which more people are competing for fewer resources [45]. 
Outcome prioritisation should therefore be viewed as an ongoing process, requiring reflection and 
revision, according to changing circumstances, as needs and options change [46–48]. 
Knowledge of Treatment  
Determining what counts as fair prioritisation of outcomes depends partly on what needs to be known 
to make the relevant decision [1,49]. Data from randomised trials is considered the ‘gold standard’ for 
establishing efficacy, however there are a number of challenges that make it expensive and time 
consuming to test the efficacy (or effectiveness) of a drug, and make it difficult to determine optimal 
clinical practice for long term treatment management in AD.  
First, there is the challenge of attrition compromising the validity and / or generalisability of results 
from trials [50]. There is evidence that older, sicker individuals in particular are more likely to drop 
out of studies [51,52], die before the trial is concluded or to discontinue the study treatment due to 
adverse effects.  
Second, people in symptomatic stages of AD are typically older and more likely to have 
comorbidities, making them complex [53–55]. RCTs of new drug products may investigate drug-drug 
interactions to some degree, but this is not always exhaustive. Data from RCTs about drug-drug 
combinations may be underpowered or simply unavailable. Since interventions may have trade-offs 
between desirable effects and undesirable side-effects, weighing these is less straightforward where 
comorbidities requiring different types of treatment are present [56]. Polypharmacy is common, 
without clinicians fully knowing the risk of harm due to lack of evidence. Indeed, separate studies are 
designed to address these issues [57], and knowledge of the mechanism of action of certain drugs 
contributes usefully to decision-making. Notwithstanding the challenges outlined, therefore, clinicians 
are not uninformed when prescribing certain drugs. Rather, the biggest challenge arises when patients 
have multiple comorbidities which all require treatment [58] since it may become necessary to 
prioritise the treatment of some rather than other in order to realise an all-things-considered, rather 
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than ideally, desirable outcome. As such, ensuring an optimal balance of outcomes in the context of 
chronic disease in old age is particularly challenging [59]. This uncertainty poses a further challenge 
for realising priority outcomes which depend on the effectiveness of a particular drug.  
Values and Circumstances 
The importance of patients being able to make their own decisions is reflected in the contemporary 
centrality of ‘patient-centred care’ [60,61]. Properly respecting the values and circumstances of 
patients does not mean swapping a paternalistic approach for an equally polar norm in which patients 
have absolute autonomy over all courses of action [62,63]. Nevertheless there is an inevitable 
imbalance between the clinical expertise of doctors and patients who are experts in their own 
experience and the subject of the disease and its treatment [64–66]. As such, patient-centred care and 
prioritisation of outcomes in AD should be conceived as a collaboration known as ‘shared decision-
making’ [67,68]. 
Knowledge-related power imbalances underline the ethical importance of remembering that it is the 
patient who must have the final say. Indeed, this is especially important in the case of AD, where 
treatment options are limited. For example, if faced with the prospect of cognitive decline a patient 
may, for example, decide not to accept a pacemaker to prevent heart failure. It is not obvious in such 
circumstances that the decision against prolonging life as long as possible is either irrational or to be 
avoided. As van Summeren et al [3] report, a dilemma often faced by patients, carers, and clinicians, 
is how to balance factors such as the benefit of palliation of symptoms and maintenance of life or 
independence against the discomfort caused by the side effects of a potentially complicated drug 
regime. Examples such as this thus remind us of the primacy of the AD patient’s right to choose, even 
within a shared decision-making model. 
Conflicting Priorities 
Complications arise when determining and combining preferences. For example, the difference 
between qualitative and quantitative findings present a challenge when pooling and attempting to 
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weigh different forms of evidence [69,70]. To mitigate this, preference elicitation techniques [71–73] 
exist to help individuals to arrive at a decision or ranking of the various outcomes and permutations.   
Ordering outcomes according to their desirability may not be straightforward, given the different 
ways in which a disease and its symptoms may affect daily living and wellbeing. For example, in 
patients with multiple conditions or comorbidities, countervailing factors will need to be taken into 
account [10] to arrive at what is, overall, the best balance between benefits and risks of one approach 
to treatment rather than another [74,75]. Ordering outcomes is also complex because the ‘best’ 
balance of risks and benefits may be plural, that is, there may be more than one ‘right’ decision in any 
given scenario. This is especially pertinent in the AD context, given that no cure is available at 
present. Were there curative treatments it may be easier to calibrate the relative desirability of 
different options since, presumably, reversing the disease would be always be prioritised over other 
outcomes. In the absence of curative treatment, deciding on the ‘right’ course of action must be made 
by the careful weighing of other, suboptimal, options.  
Ethical challenges in outcome prioritisation also emerge when priorities conflict, for example between 
short- and long-term treatment goals, considering that the development of drugs and tests is slow and 
resource intensive [76], even when research funding prioritises a particular condition [77]. Moreover, 
there may be challenges in involving all relevant stakeholders in the prioritisation process [78]. For 
example, factors such as linguistic barriers and insensitivity to different cultural values mean that 
minority ethnic groups are under-represented in research [8,79–81]. 
There may also be intractable conflicts of priorities in relation to decisions concerning the end of life. 
Qualitative research by Goodman et al (2013) [5] reminds us that for many people with dementia, 
death may be preferable to a severely impaired life with dementia. Since family members and carers 
cannot (legally) hasten death to bring an end to unwanted suffering, it is not obvious how such wishes 
can be meaningfully accommodated. 
As Hunter [82] writes, questions about whose responsibility it is to engage in the process of 
prioritising outcomes are also ethically contentious. This creates a further set of practical ethical 
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complexities around the balance of duties and responsibilities between patients, carers, society at 
large, clinicians, policy makers, health economists, and other bodies with a stake in optimising care. 
For instance, prioritisation can be complex when making choices regarding prevention or disease 
progression, such as whether to provide treatment to those who are most in need, or those who would 
benefit the most. There is no straightforward way to resolve dilemmas such as this, which reminds us 
we cannot assume that priorities will be uniform and agreed between patients, their carers, clinicians, 
and the wider general public [47,48,83]. Indeed, such dilemmas may be fundamentally unresolvable, 
given that, ultimately, one group’s interests will be relatively de-prioritised. 
We can go further still than this to reinforce the point if we keep in mind that allocation dilemmas in a 
specific context such as AD are not unique in their complexity, since in the vast majority of instances, 
notwithstanding certain paradigmatically immoral acts such as torture or rape, ethical judgements are 
always contestable. Since there is no objectively agreed standard of measurement or value as is more 
readily available in the sciences, it is the nature of moral deliberation that grounds for rational 
disagreement can never be completely extinguished. Returning to the extant context of health 
outcome prioritisation in AD, therefore,  this general characteristic of ethical discourse underwrites 
the claim that what counts as a successful decision and legitimate prioritisation of outcomes will 
consist in the fastidiousness of the process by which the decision was reached in terms of considering 
the views of as wide a range of stakeholders as possible [84], rather than the decision itself. 
Communication, Autonomy and Caregiver Issues 
AD impedes communication [84], cognition [85], autonomous decision-making [86], social 
participation [87], independence [88] and has a psychological and emotional impact affecting 
relationships and perceptions of self and personhood [89,90] as the disease progresses from Mild 
Cognitive Impairment (MCI) onwards [4,48]. This becomes increasingly significant as the disease 
advances and compromises more aspects of life, as family carers may often need to spend an 
increasing amount of time supporting their relative with AD and making decisions on their behalf on 
the basis of what they take to be the relative’s wishes [4,91].  
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Questions of self-determination are immediately relevant in this context. Seeking out the preferences 
of people with AD and other dementias is crucial as far as it is possible to do so [92] and it is 
important not to assume that people with dementia are necessarily unable to speak for or represent 
themselves, albeit that sensitivity and flexibility must be shown to the varying lengths of time that 
someone with AD may need to make choices or communicate their wishes [93]. For example, at the 
end of life it is of the utmost importance that the dying person’s wishes are understood as explicitly as 
possible in advance [94–96], moreover, it should not be assumed that people will be unable to express 
their preferences in some form, even at later stages of the disease or at the end of life [11,97]. This is 
vital when considering who has a say in determining which outcomes matter: firstly to ensure that 
those who can contribute do so; and secondly to ensure that first-hand experiences of different disease 
stages are represented. This is an issue of both fairness – in that there should be no systematic 
exclusion based on assumptions about capacity at particular stages; and validity - in that the actual 
priorities of patients are heard above the hypothetical priorities of those imagining being in such 
circumstances. 
The completion of advance directives by individuals before their dementia becomes too advanced to 
communicate their preferences towards the end of life are one option for negotiating likely future 
communication issues [98]. However, these are not without potential ethical problems; for example 
that they are often left incomplete such that the individual’s wishes are uncertain or unknown to carers 
and others [95]; and the validity of advance directives can be disputed or undermined given that it is 
possible an individual’s preferences change after they are no longer able to communicate this to others 
[92]. As such, when attempting to make prioritisation decisions in the later stages of AD, it is 
important to keep in mind that advance directives, while undoubtedly a vital tool for eliciting 
preferences, are nevertheless fallible.    
Given the progressive, degenerative nature of AD it can become increasingly difficult to know the 
priorities and preferences of the person affected. Often, caregivers, whether professional or unpaid, 
family members, or partners are able to understand the affected person’s wishes as their ability to 
clearly communicate their preferences diminishes [84,99–101]. However, this presents a challenge for 
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ensuring that carers properly represent the affected person's interests and, crucially, that they respect 
and protect the dignity of the person with dementia [102]. This is a considerable ethical challenge, as 
knowing what we ought to do for people with AD if their preferences are only indirectly discernible 
or require interpretation raises the risk of erroneous decisions. Again, the limitations of advance 
directives should also be taken into account in relation to this point.   
People with AD are vulnerable if they cannot communicate effectively and may be more reliant on 
their carers to represent their interests. While most carers will do this, it cannot be assumed that all 
risks of misrepresentation or mistreatment are eliminated [103]. For example, carers’ evaluations of 
the quality of life of people with AD are typically negative [104], but we cannot verify this precisely 
because of the impaired communication that the disease brings about. Similarly, there is evidence to 
suggest that carers wish patients to remain in the milder stages for as long as possible and decline 
rapidly towards the end to minimise the impact that it will have on them, but we cannot assume that 
this is what the person being cared for would also wish [105]. One reason may be that the burden and 
risk of isolation experienced by carers increases as the patient’s disease progresses, and their 
judgement of the patient's quality of life can be negatively influenced by the deterioration in their own 
quality of life [106,107]. Nevertheless, it is important here to consider carers as stakeholders with a 
legitimate voice of their own regarding outcome prioritisation, separate from the extent to which they 
can reliably interpret the wishes of those for whom they are caring [108,109]. 
Disclosure of Risk 
The risk of progressing from MCI to AD may be an important outcome for people in early stages of 
cognitive decline; however, the uncertainty of such predictions and the limited ability to act on it, 
make knowledge of one’s risk ethically complex. For instance, although preclinical testing for AD is 
advancing in accuracy and scope [110], understanding the wishes of all those to whom such testing 
may be relevant is important for harm reduction [111] and ensuring individuals have the greatest 
scope for decision-making that they wish to have, whatever their decisions and preferences following 
risk disclosure might be. People identified at high risk of developing AD, such as some MCI patients, 
will already feature in such considerations, since, as Rose (1985) [112] points out, the best indicator 
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of major disease in future is often the existing presence of minor disease. Indeed, the current 
diagnostic guidelines state that AD dementia is preceded by MCI, and MCI is preceded by an 
asymptomatic preclinical AD phase [113]. However, as algorithms become better at predicting risk in 
asymptomatic individuals - namely, those who have biomarkers of the disease but no symptoms- 
those to whom this will become relevant will increase in line with the increasing accuracy of 
predicting AD at the asymptomatic stage. 
In each group deemed at risk, the ethical ramifications of testing centre on how individuals, and those 
close to them, should respond to risk information as well as what responsibilities fall on those 
disclosing the risk status. For example, this will extend to family members, as knowledge that a 
relative will or is likely to develop AD will affect their lives, not least because some of those family 
members or partners may have to become carers [43,114]. Moreover, in the case of genetic risk 
factors for AD which can be identified at any age, such as APOE, genetically related relatives may be 
faced with a decision about whether they too wish to undergo testing for presence of such markers 
[115]. 
These scenarios are ethically challenging as long as AD remains incurable. For example, while 
cognitively normal, asymptomatic, individuals may be able to reduce their risk of developing MCI or 
AD by making lifestyle changes in mid-life, there is an absence of high-quality, reliable evidence for 
the effectiveness of these changes, and as such they do not guarantee it [116,117]. As such, it cannot 
be assumed that individuals will necessarily prioritise receiving risk information in the absence of a 
guarantee that successful prevention is possible. Nevertheless, there may be benefits to early risk 
assessment and diagnosis, since it enables patients to more capably make legal and care arrangements 
and change their lifestyle so that they can maximise the time they have with significant others 
[118,119] or to make plans to end their lives before dementia makes that impossible. 
To the extent that a foundational duty of healthcare professionals is avoiding and preventing harm, it 
is necessary to keep in mind a broad conception of harm that encompasses not only physical and 
cognitive impairment caused by the progression of AD, but psychological and emotional damage that 
may come to people by knowing their risk. It is straightforward to state that individuals are entitled to 
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be informed of all the findings of their scan, however distressing these might be, if they wish to and 
understand the implications of what they might be told. However, it should not be assumed that, for 
example, cognitively normal but amyloid positive individuals [13] should automatically be informed 
of the results of their scan without prior discussion as to the individual’s preferences for disclosure 
[120], as it  may cause significant distress even if the information is sought. Indeed, amyloid positive 
individuals may live to old age [121] or die before developing notable symptoms, either because of 
another condition or an accident, even though there is a consensus among clinicians that these 
individuals would have developed dementia had death not intervened first. In these cases, it is 
important to elicit what an individual's preferences are with respect to AD, relative to other health 
risks that they face, also taking into account how legal rights to the disclosure of information to 
individuals are framed in different jurisdictions.  
Aside from the harms of the disease, therefore, disclosure may pose a risk of psychological and 
emotional harm to affected individuals [122], their carers and families, and the interpersonal 
relationships between them [123]. Finally, for individuals with private health coverage rather than the 
majority in the European context who depend on state health provision, known information relating to 
the risk of disease may affect individuals' insurance premiums and coverage and cover if they are 
obliged to disclose this to insurers [23,64,108,109,124], and a the risk of harm that may come from 
the exploitation of this information by insurers should be taken into account when balancing the 
priority of potential outcomes. The risks outlined are some of those adduced in arguments against 
dementia screening [125,126] and help to demonstrate that although an assumption that diagnosis and 
knowledge of one's condition would and should always be one's priority may look prima facie 
reasonable, when subjected to scrutiny the situation reveals itself too complex for the assumption to 
be applicable or necessarily beneficial.  
 
 
 
19 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis indicates that the themes identified can be grouped into three larger arrangements of 
overlapping ethical issues in outcome prioritisation, which we now discuss. We will also make some 
remarks about what normative approaches might be appropriate for negotiating them; for example, 
philosophical tools such as differing theories of justice can inform debate and decision-making in 
arriving at conclusions about how resources should be distributed; and (social) scientific tools such as 
quantitative and qualitative research methodologies can help to elicit personal perspectives that are 
required for understanding what outcomes are important to whom, and why. It is important to note 
here that there are research consortia which draw together and integrate these expertise towards 
developing fair and equitable methods of outcome prioritisation in AD, such as IMI EU EFPIA 
ROADMAP [14,127] 
The first group of issues relates to the importance of ensuring the adequacy of the procedures 
according to which finite resources are allocated. For example, if the needs of a certain group of 
people cannot be met because it would not be cost-effective to do so, then it is important: first, that 
relevant professionals are trained to give individuals difficult and potentially distressing news; and 
second, that the commissioning process is thorough and comprehensively justified, with efforts to 
prevent geographical disparities, or ‘postcode lotteries’ in provision (themes 1, 2, 6, 7). Similarly, 
procedures for prioritising outcomes must be able to respond effectively to advances in therapy and 
the consideration of these under whatever protocol for allocation is applied. If it is important to 
maximise the benefit from available treatments, then it commensurately important to ensure that 
potentially beneficial new developments can be incorporated into resource allocation decision 
procedures. For these kinds of considerations, we adopt the most general, macro-level perspective. 
Given that due consideration for the correct balance of rights and responsibilities between the state 
and the individual falls within the purview of ethics, it is here that the philosophical tools derived 
from understanding competing theories of justice are instructive for negotiating resource allocation 
and prioritisation dilemmas. 
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The second set of issues relates to the specific outcomes to be measured and prioritised and how to 
ensure that those measured are most important and meaningful to relevant stakeholders (themes 3, 4, 
5, 7, 8, 9). Prioritisation can only meet the needs and wishes of the affected parties the outcomes 
valued by the people to whom allocation decisions pertain are known. This may change at different 
stages of the disease and hence it is important also to have valid and reliable outcome assessment 
tools to measure the priority outcomes that are appropriate to these different stages. This obviates the 
need to elicit the preferences of people with AD and their carers, rather than assuming what outcomes 
are desired and in what order of preference. Moreover, as we pointed out, understanding what 
outcomes are prioritised and in what order is also complicated in view of the complexity of AD. 
Medications may have side-effects and / or drug-drug interactions that may affect the overall outcome 
for a patient, and since AD is largely a disease of old age it is frequently important to take 
comorbidities into account when attempting to attach a value to a particular outcome and course of 
action [34]. To the extent that a duty of prioritisation decisions is to optimise outcomes for people 
with AD, understanding the preferences of these people is a necessary step in discharging that duty. 
These demands can be met by qualitative and quantitative research methods in the form of interviews, 
focus groups, surveys, questionnaires, and digital data collection. As such, social science research 
tools can be usefully employed for seeking out and understanding individual preferences and the 
reasons behind them. 
The careful application of these tools is also valuable for negotiating the third group of ethical 
challenges, which, like the issue of age-related comorbidities, is highly relevant to AD, and concerns 
the way in which individual preferences are sought (themes 3, 7, 8). AD can impair the ability of 
affected people to clearly make and convey their preferences and wishes, and so there is a potential 
ethical risk in not prioritising outcomes in a way that meets the needs and wishes of those people. 
Furthermore, given that AD can impair communication, carers may need to make decisions on a 
patient’s behalf, and there may be conflicting accounts of the patient's best interests. Adequate and 
ethically robust outcome prioritisation processes depend partly on first having identified what is 
needed by and important to people with AD, and as such the procedures used to elicit this information 
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must be capable of doing so. Since cost-effectiveness decisions are necessarily utility-driven, unless 
preferences for outcomes are successfully elicited and appropriately quantified, there is a risk that 
these important qualitative aspects of AD are lost against the background of the aggregative method 
by which prioritisation is directed.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
This is a non-systematic narrative review. One potential limitation may come from the type of 
conducted search, where only the titles were searched for presence of keywords. This limitation was 
mitigated by subsequent snowball sampling of further relevant manuscripts, which significantly 
increased the number of papers eligible for review. Another potential limitation may come from the 
single-reviewer process applied to this study at the abstract selection and initial full-text review 
stages. This limitation was to some extent mitigated by the iterative analysis process, where all 
contributors reviewed, discussed and contextualized the results, reaching back to the original sources 
as needed; and by the reviewing of a subset of titles by a co-author and comparison of decisions for 
inclusion and exclusion. A further limitation is that since we have only used English language studies 
in this paper, we are unsure of the reliability of our findings for non-English speaking AD 
communities. However, this was unavoidable given the resources available to the authors.  
A final limitation is that since the later stages of editing post-peer review were carried out during the 
initial lockdown phase of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, the authors are unable to review literature 
about the ethical implications of outcome prioritisation in AD in the context of the current pandemic 
and potential future ones. Given that the paper is based on a review of the relevant literature, while 
AD-relevant studies produced in light of the pandemic will undoubtedly emerge, the paper has not 
been produced sufficiently long after the initial global infection for such material to be published 
made available for analysis.  
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Nevertheless, we can make a tentative remark that it would be worthwhile to investigate in future 
work. It is likely that situations such as the Covid-19 pandemic may change what are considered 
acceptable trade-offs in outcome prioritisation within the eight themes that we identify in this study. A 
possible concrete example of this might be accepting the additional safety risks associated with 
remote monitoring of people with AD living on their own, in order to shield them from the more 
immediate infectious disease risk that would come with usual levels of face-to-face contact. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis demonstrates the essential role that ethical deliberation plays in ensuring the just 
prioritisation of outcomes. Given that discussions about how we ‘should’ allocate resources is an 
irreducibly normative question, expertise in ethical and philosophical reasoning are indispensable for 
a task such as this, irrespective of the fact that the task is an applied one and these kinds of expertise 
are putatively theoretical. Of course, the evidence to which we refer is similarly indispensable, since 
without empirical information about how and why different stakeholders prioritise outcomes in the 
way that they do, no rational negotiation of these towards a just outcome can be carried out. 
Nevertheless, what ought to be done cannot simply be read off these descriptive data. For this reason, 
allied with the compelling need to find new strategies for managing AD in view of the growing 
societal pressure that it is exerting, we conclude by reiterating the central role that ethical reflection 
contributes in decision-making processes regarding the prioritisation of patient outcomes. 
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